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Abstract 
 
This paper describes the result of a thorough 
analysis and evaluation of the so-called FIWARE 
platform from a smart application development point 
of view. FIWARE is the result of a series of well-
funded EU projects that is currently intensively 
promoted throughout public agencies in Europe and 
world-wide. The goal was to figure out how services 
provided by FIWARE facilitate the development of 
smart applications. It was conducted first by an 
analysis of the central components that make up the 
service stack, followed by the implementation of a 
pilot project that aimed on using as many of these 
services as possible. 
1. Introduction 
FIWARE is an initiative to provide a platform and 
a set of standardized APIs to support the creation of 
Smart Applications in various fields. It initially started 
in 2011 as an EU’s Seventh Framework Programme 
(FP7) project with the goal of “introducing an 
innovative infrastructure for cost-effective creation 
and delivery of services, providing high QoS and 
security guarantees”[1], having a budget of close to 70 
million Euro. Since then it has got significant 
attention resulting in various follow-up 
projects[2][3][4]. Besides this, the so called FIWARE 
Foundation[5] was recently founded with the goal to 
build a sustainable community around the project. 
FIWARE is also promoted as a perfect open-source 
choice for building smart city applications that should 
prevent vendor lock-in situations.  
This paper therefore reports on a feasibility study 
that was conducted in order to find out how well-
suited the FIWARE platform is to support smart city 
applications. It was actually conducted in two steps. 
In a first pre-pilot phase the individual components of 
the platform were analyzed. Based on the findings of 
this study – especially focusing on those points that 
were thought to be problematic at that time – a small 
pilot project was designed to demonstrate the 
platform’s capabilities in a realistic scenario and use-
case. 
2. The FIWARE Platform 
The core of the FIWARE ecosystem is the so 
called FIWARE platform. It is a set of public and 
free-to-use API specifications that come along with 
open source reference implementations. There also 
exists an initiative called FIWARE lab, which offers 
the platform in a cloud environment. Whereas the 
FIWARE lab is merely for testing, experimenting and 
evaluation, the FIWARE iHub initiative is supposed to 
provide production-ready cloud services in the future. 
The FIWARE platform is grouped in seven major 
parts called the “generic enablers (GEs)”[6]. Every 
GE represents a certain aspect of FIWARE services 
and also provides one or more components along with 
reference implementations that support the specified 
APIs. Additionally, there are so called “domain 
specific enablers (DSEs) that (will) provide 
components for certain domains like health, energy 
and so on. The general enablers are organized as 
follows: 
• Data/Context Management: This contains all 
components that are needed to store, access, 
process and analyze data as part of a smart 
application 
• Internet of Things (IoT) Services 
Enablement: Here are all components needed 
to setup sensor networks and routing sensor 
data to other GEs. 
• Advanced Web-based User Interface: 
Components to design user interfaces, 
including geographical information and 
interactive 3D charts 
• Security: Components to add, define and 
enforce declarative security 
• Advanced middleware and interfaces to 
Network and Devices 
• Applications/Services and Data Delivery: 
Components and tools for data visualization, 
easy generation of mashups and app-store-like 
distribution of services and data 
• Cloud Hosting: Components and tools aiming 
at providing and managing FIWARE services 
via cloud infrastructure 
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 FIWARE used a great variety of different 
programming languages (C++, Java, Python, NodeJS, 
...) and environments for developing their reference 
implementations. Fortunately, the FIWARE 
community provides docker[7] images for every 
component, which makes dealing with different 
runtime requirements relatively easy. 
3. The Pilot Project 
As already pointed out previously, the feasibility 
study was conducted in two steps. The first one was 
about analyzing the functionality of the individual 
components provided by FIWARE without any 
specific scenario in mind. In order to support a 
detailed analysis, it was decided not to use the 
FIWARE lab infrastructure, but to run all components 
on premise. This also allowed to use the latest version 
of every component and also to get some insight into 
the setup and the interaction of these components. 
One important outcome of this first analysis was, that 
apparently due to the individual progress of certain 
components the interaction with other components, 
which is vital for the operation of the entire FIWARE 
platform, was no longer working without problems. 
This seemed specifically true for a key aspect of 
FIWARE: Security. Thus, the focus of the pilot 
project was put on implementing a permission system 
using FIWARE’s internal security mechanism, since 
security is definitely a key issue in smart city 
applications and therefore a knock-out criterion if it 
cannot be met. 
The context of the pilot project was “smart living”. 
It was not important to demonstrate a lot of 
functionality, but to point out where an application 
can benefit from using FIWARE’s services rather than 
creating a proprietary implementation for them. Thus, 
the goal was to maximize the use of platform services 
on the basis of a proof of concept. The assumption – 
actually inspired by a real project – was that there is a 
new neighborhood to be created on the grounds of a 
former industrial compound. The newly created 
apartment and office buildings will be equipped with 
a variety of sensors that shall be utilized for smart 
applications. Since the main focus was on security, it 
was decided to use only one sensor type (temperature) 
in the pilot project. 
 The scenario was as follows: A smart mobile 
application will be given to all tenants living in the 
new apartment buildings. In every apartment, there is 
(at least) one sensor measuring the temperature and 
reporting it to the smart application platform. All 
tenants can observe the temperature in their 
apartment(s), including changes over the last five 
days. They will automatically receive a notification if 
something extraordinary (e.g. temperature is too low 
or raises extremely fast) seems to happen. 
Additionally, there also exists maintenance staff 
responsible for one or several buildings. They will 
have access to all sensor data in their building, 
including those installed in staircases and corridors. If 
something happens that indicates an incidence or 
malfunction, responsible maintenance personnel shall 
also receive notifications. Additionally, the whole 
system is administrated by a so-called building 
administration that creates users (tenants, janitors, ...) 
and registers them with apartments and buildings. It is 
important that all users have only access to data 
within their area of interest. Besides this, also sensors 
are seen as critical infrastructure and therefore must 
not expose vulnerabilities to the system. 
4. The Data Layer 
The application needs a mechanism to store its 
data (buildings, apartments, tenants, …) and usually 
this data layer is provided by a database. In case of 
FIWARE there is a service called context broker. The 
context broker is essentially a REST API based on the 
Open Mobile Alliance’s Next Generation Service 
Interface (NGSI)[7]. It comes with a reference 
implementation called Orion1, which technically 
consists of a MongoDB database with an NGSI REST 
API on top of it. It allows for the creation of all 
necessary entities and does not require any database 
schema. All entities are stored in a normalized way in 
one MongoDB collection. Every entity has at least 
two fields to identify it. One is called ‘type’ (e.g. 
“Apartment”) and the other one is called ‘id’ (e.g. 
“Top12”). 
The context broker allows for multiple tenants. By 
using a header-field called “Fiware-Service”, that can 
be unique within one application or domain, data can 
be nicely separated. Technically the “Fiware-Service” 
header identifies a MongoDB database used behind 
the scenes. Thus, if applications use different values 
for the “Fiware-Service” header field, their requests 
can never interfere. 
The context broker supports all required CRUD 
operations. By default, however, all requests are based 
on the so called “normalized” notation, which means 
that every query returns its result along with metadata 
like field type. But there exists an option called 
‘keyValues’, which switches to plain JSON and 
therefore makes the NGSI protocol transparent to the 
client application. This greatly facilitates the creation 
of applications, since they do not have to tread context 
broker requests any different than other REST APIs. 
On the other side, there is also a minor, yet 
important design flaw in one specific aspect. Similar 
to the header field “Fiware-Service” that can be used 
to separate the data storage for different applications 
or domains, there is an additional header-field called 
                                                            
1 https://github.com/telefonicaid/fiware-orion 
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 “Servicepath” that is intended to further structure or 
classify data within an application or domain[9]. The 
problem with using this field is that it cannot be read 
via the API. Thus, if this field was set, there is no way 
to later figure out its value. This is critical, since 
besides id and type also the servicepath is part of the 
“primary key” that uniquely identifies an entity. Thus, 
there can be two entities with the same type and id but 
different servicepath, which leads to an error when 
making a query by id. Since, however, it is impossible 
to figure out what the servicepath of an existing entity 
is, this can lead to serious issues. So, although the idea 
behind the servicepath is nice, it should not be used 
until the API is extended to also include this field in 
the response. 
One of the most powerful features of the context 
broker, however, is the capability to subscribe to 
events. This allows to nicely react to changes in the 
data store. Subscriptions can be of different scope, 
like “inform me whenever a new entity is created” or 
“inform me, whenever the temperature in room 212 
exceeds 25 degrees Celsius”. This greatly facilitates 
the implementation of smart applications.  
In our pilot project, we ended up with the 
following entity types:  
• Person: Representing the properties of persons 
involved in the use-cases, including tenants 
(living in an apartment), maintenance staff 
(responsible for one or more buildings), and 
building administration staff (administering a 
group of buildings) 
• Building Administration: A company that 
owns and/or administrates a set of buildings. 
• Building 
• Apartment: Part of a building rented by one or 
more tenants. 
5. Attaching Sensors 
An important part of smart applications is the 
ability to automatically react to changes in the 
environment. Therefore, sensor networks play a 
crucial role. This could be surveillance cameras that 
are used to detect free parking slots and route users to 
this place, or simple sensors that deliver a single 
numeric value like the current temperature. Within the 
pilot project it was important to demonstrate how 
sensors can be integrated into the platform and how 
their values are made available to the application on 
top of it.  In our context, we had temperature sensors 
that were installed in buildings and in apartments. For 
the sake of simplicity, we decided to have only one 
sensor per apartment and building, since the focus was 
less on a realistic scenario but on the interaction of the 
various FIWARE components. It turned out that 
FIWARE provides a very nice way to integrate 
sensors into the application via its Internet of Things 
(IoT) General Enabler (GE). The reference 
implementation of this GE is called IDAS[10]. It 
provides a REST endpoint with the API required for 
registering sensors and dealing with their data. Before 
a sensor can be added to the system, in a first step a 
so-called service needs to be created, which serves as 
the logical endpoint for a group of sensors. The 
general idea is that sensors provide values for 
properties of entities stored in the context broker (e.g. 
the temperature of a specific room or apartment). So, 
when registering a new sensor device, a reference to 
this entity needs to be set up. This reference has to 
include the entity_name (which is the id property 
within the context broker), the entity_type (e.g. 
‘building’, ‘apartment’, …) and the name and type of 
the entity’s property that will eventually hold the 
sensor’s value. The registration also has to include a 
device_id that is used to uniquely identify the sensor. 
Thus, whenever a sensor reports a new value to 
the IoT component via REST (using its device_id and 
the id of the IoT service), the value is extracted from 
the request and the corresponding entity within the 
context broker gets updated by the IoT component. 
So, in our example every apartment and building had 
a property called temperature that was always holding 
the latest value reported by the connected sensor. 
Here the problem with the servicepath property 
described in the previous chapter became evident. The 
IoT component can only identify a specific entity 
using a pair consisting of entity_name and entity_type. 
The context broker, however, internally uses a triple 
consisting of these two fields and the servicepath. So, 
if the servicepath of an entity is set to some non-
default value, it can no longer be referenced by IDAS. 
In such a case, instead of updating the existing entity, 
a new entity with the given entity_name, entity_type 
and the default servicepath is created that only holds 
the property defined by the sensor (temperature in this 
case). 
Another important fact is that with every new 
sensor value, the previous value gets overwritten. 
Thus, there is no time-series of values stored in the 
context broker. 
6. Historic Data and Time Series 
When only using the IoT and Context Broker 
components, no time series data will be available, 
since new sensor data replaces the existing one. If, 
however, the historic data shall be preserved, an 
additional component called Cygnus[11] is required. 
This component is essentially an extension of Apache 
Flume[12]. 
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Figure 1: Data flow upon arrival of new 
sensor value 
 
The idea is to create a subscription with the 
context broker in order to get informed once a 
particular property of the entities of a specific type 
(e.g. the temperature property of entities of type 
apartment) changes. Whenever such an event occurs, 
the data related to this event gets stored in a data sink. 
Possible data sinks are MongoDB, HDFS, 
PostgreSQL and many more. This data and event flow 
is shown in Figure 1. When the sensor sends a new 
value to the IoT component, this will result in an 
update request sent to the context broker, which in 
turn causes the context broker to inform all interested 
subscribers. Cygnus receives the event sent from the 
context broker and stores it in the registered data 
sink(s). 
This architecture allows for a clear separation of 
live data stored in the context broker and the historical 
data stored in any database of choice. Having split the 
task over several loosely and asynchronously 
connected components allows for high performance 
and throughput. Probably most important, this can all 
be achieved without a single line of programming so 
far. 
Since everything in FIWARE is about REST-
based APIs, there is also a component that allows for 
RESTful access to the historic data sink. The name of 
this component is Short Term Historic (STH) and the 
reference implementation is called Comet[13]. It 
provides an API for reading historic data produced by 
the component chain described above, but only 
supports MongoDB data sinks so far. 
7. Complex Event Processing 
To make our pilot project “smart”, the goal was to 
automatically recognize suspicious patterns in sensor 
values that might indicate incidents or malfunction. 
As was already mentioned in section 4, simple cases 
(e.g. temperature lies outside a specified range) can be 
solved solely relying on the context broker’s 
subscription model. But what about a sensor that is 
defective and does not send a signal at all? Or a sensor 
that does report a rapid temperature increase by more 
than 10°C within 10 minutes? 
To recognize things like this, the FIWARE 
platform provides the so-called Complex Event 
Processing (CEP) General Enabler with a reference 
implementation called Proactive Technology Online 
(Proton)[14].  
During the evaluation, it became quickly clear that 
this implementation is far from being production 
ready when it comes to usability and error handling. 
While generally the documentation of the FIWARE 
components seems not always to reflect the latest 
version of the actual software, the documentation on 
Proton is specifically poor and it took lots of trial and 
error and research on stackoverflow to get it running 
at all. For example, Proton supports different types of 
events. They are called ContextUpdate (which means 
incoming data from sensors, typically via context 
broker subscriptions), Alert and Warning (which both 
stand for outgoing events). However, when creating a 
new event there is no way to define its type other than 
using a naming “convention”. This is not actually a 
“convention” since failing to name events with 
exactly these suffixes results in an error. The error 
message, however, does not tell the user about this 
“convention” but is a plain Java NullPointerException 
stack trace with no clue about the reason of the 
problem at all. Consequently, Proton must be 
considered an “expert system” that apparently can 
only be used by people who have been closely 
involved in its development process. 
Anyway, with this tool, it is possible to create 
time-framed rules via so called TemporalContexts. 
This way it was possible to react to a certain number 
of sensor events within a given period of time. 
Unfortunately, we failed to distinguish between 
individual devices, thus, all events coming from any 
sensor were considered here. The documentation 
describes a so-called SegmentationContext that is 
designed to keep different event sources separated. 
But since the time budget reserved for the evaluation 
of this component was already exhausted, we had to 
give up on that. Even tutorials on the web2 mention 
that there are still severe bugs in the software. In 
response to issue reports on Github, we learned that 
development of this component was already stopped. 
Thus, this part of the platform needs to be considered 
incomplete and it is more likely the better option to 
integrate some alternative tool instead (e.g. Apache 
Flink’s CEP[15]). 
8. Security 
As we already pointed out in section 3, security 
was a key requirement for the pilot project. In fact, 
                                                            
2 https://appshelfer.de/09/ 
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 none of the components that have been discussed so 
far provides any security mechanism at all. This 
means, that as soon as the context broker is up and 
running there are no restrictions on using the REST 
API. As a consequence, every user can read, write and 
also delete any data stored there. The same is true for 
all other components. So how can these resources be 
protected then? Definitely the first thing that needs to 
happen is that none of the REST endpoints must be 
accessible from any untrusted network. For the rest, 
the FIWARE platform provides three components that 
need to interact together in order to provide controlled 
and safe interaction with the other services and 
applications. These components are: 
• Identity Manager (IdM): This is a service to 
create users, roles and permission. 
• Policy Decision Point (PDP): This service 
provides authorization by deciding whether the 
current user is allowed to perform a certain 
action 
• Policy Enforcement Point (PEP): This is a 
proxy server that performs the actual 
authentication and optional authorization 
checks in interaction with the other two 
components 
8.1. The Identity Manager (IdM) 
 
The IdM is the central component of the FIWARE 
security architecture. Its reference implementation is 
called Keyrock[16] and it is based on OpenStack 
Keystone[17], which in turn is an open source 
implementation of the OpenStack Identity API[18]. 
Keyrock is – besides the CEP rule editor – the only 
FIWARE component that comes with a web-based 
user interface. This web interface is internally called 
Horizon whereas Keyrock more specifically refers to 
the REST interface. 
Keyrock is essentially an OAuth2[18] 
authorization server and therefore supports 
authentication for the entire platform as well as client 
applications on top of the FIWARE infrastructure. It 
is holding all user information and is a single sign-on 
service for all components and applications. Thus, 
applications do not necessarily need to maintain user 
information (especially no private credentials) and 
one account can be used for all applications using the 
platform.  
With the IdM’s web interface, it is possible to 
create/register: 
• Users (“resource owners” according to 
OAuth2) with their credentials 
• Applications using FIWARE services 
(“clients”) along with an automatically 
generated pair of credentials needed to interact 
with the authorization server (e.g. to retrieve 
the access token) 
• Roles within an application (logical names of 
different user groups) 
• Permissions (detailed access rules) assigned to 
roles 
• Assignments of roles to users in the context of 
an application 
 
8.2.  Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) 
 
The reference implementation of this component 
is called Wilma[20] and it is playing the role of the 
so-called resource server according to OAuth2. The 
resource server is hosting information that is sensitive 
and therefore can only be accessed by authorized 
requests. In fact, sensitive information is stored in the 
context broker, the IoT service and of course also in 
our client application and several other services. 
Wilma is therefore implemented as a simple proxy 
server (also called PEP proxy) that is adding security 
by transparently acting on behalf of the actual service 
that needs to be protected. Thus, instead of allowing 
direct access to a sensitive service, clients interact 
with the proxy (see Figure 2). It is also possible to 
configure so-called public URLs for which the proxy 
won’t perform any security checks. Otherwise the 
proxy checks authentication with the other security 
components (in this case the IdM) and forwards the 
request to the actual resource server (called “Back-end 
Apps” in the graphic) if security constraints are met. 
Therefore, the PEP proxy needs to know about the 
addresses and ports of the service it is protecting and 
of the other security components. Additionally, when 
registering a new application with the IdM, also a pair 
of credentials for the PEP proxy is generated that is 
needed by the proxy to authenticate with the IdM. 
 
Figure 2: Authentication (Level 1 
Security)[20] 
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 So, if the request is properly authenticated, the 
protected application has access to the user id and the 
roles of the current user, which are provided as a list 
of role names. It is important to realize that in this 
scenario (called Level 1 security in FIWARE) only 
authentication is checked, but it is not tested, whether 
the user is allowed to perform the current action. To 
deploy authorization, there exist two possible options.  
• Application layer security 
• Platform layer security (Level 2 or Level 3 
Security) 
In the first case, authorization decisions are made 
as part of the application logic. Since the application 
has access to the current user’s id and roles and it also 
knows about the semantics of these roles in can decide 
whether it allows for this action to be performed or 
not. Alternatively, also the FIWARE platform 
supports authentication based on so called 
permissions (see next section), which takes security 
related decisions out of the application logic and 
performs them on the platform layer. 
FIWARE provides a sample application3 that is 
designed as a tutorial for using FIWARE’s GEs. This 
tutorial is using application layer security and 
therefore cannot be used as a reference to the Level 
2/3 security approach. Since the goal of our pilot was 
the demonstrate the platform services (with a clear 
focus on security), we decided to go for platform 
authorization. 
 
8.3. Policy Decision Point (PDP) 
 
Figure 3: Platform level authorization  
(Level 2)[20] 
When making use of platform level authorization 
(called Level 2 and Level 3) an additional component 
called the Policy Decision Point (PDP) is needed. 
FIWARE provides a reference implementation called 
AuthZForce[21]. The authorization flow is shown in 
Figure 3. 
                                                            
3 https://github.com/Fiware/tutorials.TourGuide-App 
In this scenario, the PEP – after having checked 
the validity of the access-token with the IdM – makes 
a consecutive request to the PDP providing the current 
user’s roles and the request details (URL plus the 
HTTP request method used). The PDP checks this 
information with its security policies and decides 
whether access should be granted or not. 
Access rules – called permissions in FIWARE – 
are written in the eXtensible Access Control Markup 
Language (XACML)[22]. Up to Level 2 security, 
developers do not have to deal with the details of 
XACML. When defining a permission, which always 
is part of a specific role, the IdM’s user interface 
simply accepts a URL and a http verb (e.g. GET, 
POST, PUT, …) that should be granted to all users 
belonging to the corresponding role. The necessary 
XACML is created automatically behind the scenes. 
Level 3, however, allows users to write custom rules 
using XML. Although rules are edited using the IdM 
web interface, they are required to be stored in the 
PDP. Thus, every time a user-profile or a role gets 
updated, the corresponding XACML policies are re-
generated and automatically transmitted to the PDP 
via REST. This, however, requires access rules to be 
stored redundantly within the IdM and the PDP, 
which turned out to be rather problematic during the 
evaluation. Besides this, every change to a role or user 
results in a new XACML security policy that is then 
made the active one, while the older versions are still 
kept. However, the number of policies per rule within 
AuthZForce is restricted to ten. So, after 10 changes 
there will be an error, that can only be solved by 
deleting older policy versions via REST requests. 
8.4. Security and the pilot project 
 
As already pointed out, it was decided to use (at 
least) level 2 security in order to evaluate platform 
level authorization. One of the potential benefits was 
to entirely exclude security from the application and 
to use a declarative rather than programmatic concept. 
One of the first problems was to make the three 
components (IdM, PEP and PDP) work together. It 
turned out that the documentation on how to configure 
this interaction is rather scarce. Besides this there had 
been some conflicts between the then available docker 
images that got solved by the FIWARE components’ 
development teams after a couple of issue reports via 
GitHub. 
Besides these problems, it soon became clear that 
a clean separation of security concerns between the 
application and the platform was not possible. Inside 
the application all persons (tenants, janitors, ...) and 
therefore potential users are stored as entities in the 
context broker. One use-case was to list the current 
temperature of all units the current user has access to. 
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 This requires establishing a mapping between the 
concept of a user as it is kept within the application 
and the user as defined within the IdM. While this was 
simply solved by using the same user name on either 
side, some other problems resulted in a significant 
programming effort. For example, whenever a tenant 
was assigned to an apartment, this required to set up 
the appropriate access rights allowing this user to read 
the respective data of the apartment, including of 
course the current temperature. To keep this in sync 
manually by requiring the administrator to maintain 
data about the user using our pilot project’s interface 
while simultaneously setting up the proper 
permissions using the IdM interface is completely 
infeasible. Thus, the decision was made to make all 
changes to the security configuration from within the 
application.  So, every time a new user (tenant or 
maintenance staff) is created in the application a 
corresponding user is created in the IdM using the 
REST API. Also, when a user is made a tenant of an 
apartment (or a janitor of a building) the proper roles 
along with their permissions are also automatically 
created using REST. Here the aforementioned 
redundancy and a lack of functionality in the IdM’s 
API became problematic. It is relatively straight 
forward to define permissions in the IdM’s web 
interface. When saving these changes, permissions are 
internally translated into XACML and sent to the PDP 
via its API. It is also possible to create the same roles 
and permissions via the IdM’s REST interface instead 
of using the web user interface, but there is no way to 
cause the IdM to transfer these programmatically 
made changes to the PDP. Consequently, it was 
necessary to directly send REST requests containing 
the correct XACML to the PDP. This would have 
allowed to write more complex rules than supported 
by the level 2 security mechanism. Unfortunately, it 
turned out that whenever the IdM’s web interface was 
used to make any change to the security configuration 
it caused the IdM to generate a new XACML policy 
based on its local configuration and to send this to the 
PDP. This will cause the programmatically – and 
potentially more sophisticated – configuration made 
by our pilot application to be overwritten by the IdM. 
Therefore, the pilot application was limited to the 
same rules that are generated by the IdM and it was 
decided to create these rules redundantly within the 
IdM and the PDP. This way, even when the IdM 
overwrites a policy, the result is essentially the same. 
Thus, in the end it turned out that a good part of 
the logic that is already part of the IdM (e.g. creating 
XACML policies out of permissions and sending 
them to the PDP) had to be re-implemented as part of 
our application. On the other hand, some 
shortcomings of the IdM had to be solved as well, like 
deleting older policies once they are no longer used. 
So, it is really questionable whether using application 
layer security in the first place would not have been 
the better option. 
While – although with significant effort – the 
application could be secured properly against 
unauthorized access from the client side, also sensors 
are forming a massive security risk, since potential 
attackers can get easily access to their hardware. Thus, 
while protecting the communication channel (e.g. 
with TLS[23] and/or VPL[24]) is important, it is 
especially critical to enforce authentication and 
authorization here as well. The IdM allows to create 
credentials for sensors as well, which is very similar 
to registering a PEP. These credentials need to be 
used by the sensor, once access to the IoT service is 
protected using a PEP proxy. Unfortunately, it turned 
out that the credentials produced be the IdM’s web 
interface – due to some restrictions in the underlying 
user type that gets created within KeyRock - can only 
be used for level 1 security only. This means that 
there is no authorization possible and that every 
authenticated sensor can technically send values on 
behalf of any other known sensor. This would allow 
attackers to use this sensor account to get potentially 
unlimited access to the sensor network. The solution 
to this unacceptable security hole was to use standard 
user accounts instead of the special sensor accounts. 
Once again, these accounts are automatically 
generated by the pilot application whenever the 
administrator adds a sensor to an apartment or 
building. This will also create a permission rule that 
allows this sensor to only send data of a specific type 
to a specific service endpoint eliminating the chance 
to spoof some other sensor’s identity. 
9. The big picture 
In Figure 4 the architecture of the entire pilot 
application and its interaction with the FIWARE 
components used is shown. 
Every labeled box represents a docker container 
and can therefore be seen as a virtual machine. The 
big box indicates the trusted environment without any 
security restrictions. The box labeled “FSH Server” 
represents the server-side logic of our pilot 
application. On the top, we see the mobile client 
application that is given to all tenants and 
maintenance staff. The admin application is used by 
the building administration to manage buildings, staff 
and tenants. At the lower end the sensor network is 
indicated. All external clients need to use a PEP proxy 
for accessing services.  
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Figure 4: The overall system architecture 
This makes sure that all requests are authenticated 
and authorized. So, once a request has passed a PEP 
proxy the application can trust it. Beside the PEP 
proxies also the port of the Keyrock service is 
publicly available. This is necessary to enable OAuth2 
authentication. The server-side application logic 
interacts with various FIWARE services. Keyrock and 
AuthZforce are used to create accounts, roles and 
permissions. IDAS is used to register sensor devices 
and to route sensor data to the correct building or 
apartment. Orion (the context broker) is used to hold 
the application’s domain. Proton is used to register 
subscriptions with the context broker and to emit 
alerts once some unusual pattern in sensor data is 
detected, while Comet is used to read the temperature 
history of a sensor (see screenshot in Figure 5). 
One constraint that was initially perceived to be 
rather limiting is the fact that every application can 
contain only one PEP proxy and that every PEP proxy 
can only protect one service endpoint. For this 
scenario, however, three PEP proxies have been 
necessary, leading to three logical applications. This 
turned out to be very intuitive and helpful in the end. 
Although the pilot was considered to be one 
application and the server-side logic is just one 
application – thanks to this PEP proxy constraint – we 
ended up with the following three ‘logical’ 
applications registered with the IdM: 
• The Client Application 
• The Administrative Application 
• The Sensor Application 
  
 
Figure 5: Screenshot of the mobile client 
application 
The practical implications are that all roles, 
permissions and their assignments to users are 
separated from one another. Thus, we have an 
individual set of users, rules and permissions for every 
of these logical applications, which leads to a clear 
structure that is considered to be very helpful. 
10. Conclusions 
The overall goal of this case study was to get an 
unbiased analysis of the capabilities of the FIWARE 
platform from a software engineering point of view. It 
was important to find out how and to which extend 
smart applications can benefit from making use of the 
various services provided by the platform. In the end, 
it could be demonstrated that there is actually some 
point in building on top of FIWARE, since there is a 
huge set of functionalities that supports smart 
application development. However, it also needs to be 
said, that the way getting there was really tedious. 
This had partly to do with the fact that FIWARE is a 
really large and complex platform with a huge set of 
components and services, which definitely takes some 
time to learn and understand, but had also to do with 
the lack of up-to-date documentation and some severe 
bugs as well as several design flaws that still exist in 
some of the components. This was especially 
surprising since already the initial effort to come up 
with such a platform was funded with close to 70 
million Euros. 
As it could be demonstrated with the pilot project, 
smart applications can significantly benefit from using 
the FIWARE platform. As long as the servicepath 
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 property is not used (see section 4), the context broker 
provides a stable and reliable persistence layer. 
Especially its subscription mechanism greatly helps to 
meet typical smart application requirements without 
the need of programming. The same is true for 
FIWARE’s IoT component and the idea of keeping 
live data separated from historic data. However, it 
needs to be stated that no performance and load tests 
have been conducted. Concerning the pilot’s security 
implementation, retrospectively it might have been 
less effort to use application layer security, allowing 
the application to make authorization decisions 
programmatically. Consequently, this is a design 
decision that needs to be made carefully, considering 
all sorts of implications like the level of trust between 
client-applications and platform components. But also 
some really severe issues have been identified during 
evaluation. Probably the biggest problem is the 
extremely poor quality of the CEP component Proton, 
which needs to be considered a key component for 
“smart” applications. As described in section 7 this 
component is extremely hard to use and contains 
several serious bugs. Even worse, this project was 
apparently stopped and is no longer under 
development. Thus, if complex event processing is 
needed – which is very likely in a smart application – 
alternative solutions need to be found. If the currently 
shaping FIWARE foundation really wants to push the 
platform, some significant action is required here. A 
second huge problem is the web interface of the IdM. 
Some of the issues here have already been discussed 
in section 8. But additionally, the interface falls short 
on some very basic functionalities. For example, it is 
currently not possible to modify, delete or even view 
existing permissions, which does not make the 
application fit for real-life use. On the other side, it 
could be demonstrated that there is always a 
workaround possible. So, if several organizations 
decide to use the FIWARE stack and commit their 
solutions and bug-fixes back to the public repository a 
lively and self-sustaining open source community 
could emerge that would make the whole platform 
even more attractive. Definitely the biggest advantage 
of the FIWARE idea is to use open standards that are 
designed to avoid vendor lock-in situations. 
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